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Abstract 
The study presents critical reflections on the course and results of Polish local 
self-government reforms from March 1990, when after 40 years of the system of 
territorial soviets (national councils), self-government was reintroduced into 
communes, until January 2018, when an attempt to improve the systemic institu-
tions of self-government in communes, poviats and voivodships was once again 
revisited. The author points out significant discrepancies between the basic ethical 
and political values of local self-government, i.e. democracy, independence and 
efficiency, and the changing content of self-government systemic laws as well as 
the practice of local authorities’ operations, and formulates proposals aimed at 
repairing Polish local self-government by adjusting its organisation and function-
ing to the principles resulting from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government. He considers as the most im-
portant the elimination of pathological phenomena of simulated local democracy 
which include: a drastically low turnout in elections and referenda, the disappear-
ance of democratic responsibility of local self-government bodies, and the auton-
omy of the directly elected executive body of the commune from the influence of 
the local representation. From this point of view, he positively assesses the new 
regulations, strengthening the guarantee of transparency of operations carried out 
by local self-government bodies and control rights of councillors, as well as ex-
panding the catalogue of initiative, consultative and control powers of citizens. He 
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points out, however, that ensuring real democracy in of the local authorities re-
quires a deeper reconstruction of the principles of self-government, the election 
process, and strengthening the role of representation in creating and enforcing the 
responsibility of executive bodies. 
Keywords:  local self-government, local democracy, democratic responsibility, 
local self-government representation, local government unit executive 
body, European Charter of Local Self-Government 
JEL Classification: H70, N44, R50, Z18 
1. The origins of local self-government in Poland 
Historical circumstances of the liquidation of local self-government and the impo-
sition of the Stalinist model of Soviet power in the countries of Central and East-
ern Europe at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s caused a much faster erosion of that 
model than in the USSR itself. One of the important reasons for that phenomenon 
was the presence in the social consciousness of the systemic alternative in the 
form of self-government traditions destroyed by the external pressure which were 
an important component of the sense of national identity and political culture. The 
vitality of the idea of local self-government in Poland is demonstrated by the fact 
that despite the great efforts made to remove it from the consciousness of society, 
the communist authorities themselves decided to refer to it at a time when their 
social base was rapidly shrinking and the ideology of “real socialism” went bank-
rupt. In 1976, phraseological changes were introduced into the Constitution of the 
Polish People’s Republic, ascribing to national councils the features of not only 
organs of state authority but also basic units of social self-government. Under the 
conditions prevailing at the time, national councils could not fulfil such a role, as 
they did not come from a democratic choice and were not able to act independent-
ly fostering local interests. On the contrary, they were even more strongly associ-
ated with the apparatus of the Communist Party and devoid of social influence. It 
was also a period of deep centralisation of governance of society and management 
of the economy.  
After August 1980, the opposition circles demanded the restoration of real 
territorial self-government. The programme of “The Self-Government Republic”, 
adopted at the First Congress of the Independent Self-Government Trade Union 
“Solidarity”, was heading in that direction. It included the thesis: “Territorially, 
organisationally and materially independent self-government must be a real repre-
sentation of the local community.” Marek Śliwiński (2005) has pointed to the 
social and even the anarchic and socialist character of the programme which pos-
tulated workers’ self-management at the enterprise level and civic self-governance 
at the level of a bottom-up built state (pp. 84–85, 140). It did not include the de-
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mand for decentralisation of public authority following the example of the  
19th-century liberal state, but it also cannot be read as an approval for the then 
existing centralised system. On the other hand, the project of general reconstruc-
tion of the social system towards pluralism and democracy was presented, and the 
content of that concept showed many similarities to the idea of subsidiarity. After 
many years, Bronisław Geremek (2002), reminisced in the text intended for an 
international audience stating that: 
The heart of the great Solidarity movement was the dream of freedom and de-
mocracy understood as the inherent right of every human being to decide about 
his own destiny and to share responsibility for the fate of the nation. (p. 122) 
The ethical dimension of the original version of the Solidarity’s programme 
is noteworthy. According to Jerzy Regulski, it was supposed to be a programme of 
the moral rebuilding of society, making it a community based on direct, authentic 
ties, as opposed to an alienated state and party-government administration (2000, 
p. 38). Thus understood self-government was an alternative not only to the com-
munist system but also to parliamentary democracy in its traditional form. Local 
self-government was to be an element of the self-governing Republic of Poland, in 
which the main role was foreseen for workers’ self-government. The implementa-
tion of the trade union’s programme did not necessarily mean a revolution or 
a political coupe. Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński (2000, pp. 53–64) sees in the first, 
romantic period of Solidarity, a culture of dialogue and cooperation, which was 
later gradually replaced by Lenin’s question “who, whom?” The course of social 
conflicts in the 1980s led to a state in which the culture of dialogue disappeared, 
and confrontational attitudes, the language of contempt, and hate speech destroyed 
the credibility of ethical ideals proclaimed by both sides of those conflicts. The 
Solidarity programme became only a political manifesto of the opposition.  
After the imposition of martial law, the struggle for local self-government 
continued. As a result of subsequent political and economic changes, however, the 
situation was fundamentally different from the vision that the first Solidarity pro-
gramme presented. That programme was not implemented at all in terms of inter-
nal relations as the transformation of Poland’s economic system from the socialist 
to capitalist one occurred. Śliwiński says that the transformation was almost ex-
clusively the work of the former elites of the Communist Party for whom the inef-
ficient and fossilised real socialism simply stopped being beneficial. The new 
system was created in the 1980s, despite the resistance and boycott on the part of 
the then underground Solidarity movement, under the Polish People’s Republic’s 
laws and decrees regarding the privatisation of state assets, and its main benefi-
ciaries were high party officials, the members of the government and directors of 
enterprises involved in the creation of domestic joint stock companies, which were 
seemingly domestic and foreign-invested enterprises, known as joint venture com-
panies (Śliwiński, 2005).  
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Jadwiga Staniszkis describes the process in question as creating political cap-
italism: the economic class emerging in that period, promoted for that role by 
political power, sought to obtain a status based essentially on its economic poten-
tial (1989, p. 127). That period was characterised by the attempts on the part of the 
authorities to modernise the current political system in the framework of the so-
called plans for the democratisation of public life. In that context, we can observe, 
among others, a formal (but not political) concession regarding the territorial sys-
tem, which was expressed in the Act of July 20, 1983 on the System of National 
Councils and Local Self-Government. It defined national councils as simultane-
ously the organs of state and local self-government. That concept was contradicto-
ry in its nature and could not be reconciled with the classical construction of local 
self-government (Stahl, 1988, p. 167). In practice, it was also a mystification: 
council members still could not be elected on a democratic and pluralistic basis 
and no communal property, which is an indispensable basis for the activity of 
local self-government, was established. Under those conditions, the law could not 
fulfil the hopes placed in it. 
The incomplete success of reform efforts, the inefficiency of the existing sys-
tem, and especially the deteriorating economic situation and the total loss of  
authority of the local administration in the late 1980s prompted the Communist 
Party to pursue a dialogue with a moderate part of the opposition and search for 
solutions acceptable to society. At the beginning of 1989, the Round Table Talks 
became an expression of that dialogue. The compromise also required concessions 
from the other party. Solidarity parted with the idea of implementing the funda-
mental theses of the original programme of self-government-based society recon-
struction, though not with the thought of local self-government as such.  
The compromise concerning the model of territorial self-government was not 
achieved at the Round Table, though the new concept of the local self-government 
system presented at the time by the opposition became gradually established in the 
awareness of politicians and social activists. It was fundamentally contrary to 
the existing model of national councils, but also different from the one expressed 
in the first Solidarity programme. The concept did not provide for systemic rela-
tions of territorial self-government with other forms of social self-governance, and 
especially with workers’ self-government. In the revised programme, the trade 
union combined the postulate of rebuilding local self-government with the liberal-
democratic concept of the state, referring to the Worldwide Declaration of Local 
Self-Government, adopted in 1985 at the World Congress of the International 
Union of Local Authorities in Rio de Janeiro. In that document, local self-
government was defined as an independent unit, separate from the state admin-
istration, operating within the framework of state structures whose scope of rights 
and obligations set forth in the statute (NSZZ “Solidarność”, 1989). Such an ap-
proach referred to the classical formulas of self-government in the state of law and 
was previously presented in the liberal circles, the Young Poland Movement 
and in some intellectual circles. 
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The introduction of the new concept into the political circuit is seen as the 
achievement of the Solidarity–opposition team of experts at the Round Table. Its 
chairman, Regulski, states that during the negotiations the greatest emphasis was 
placed on the issues of self-government independence, financial separation, and 
democratic elections. The government-coalition team, chaired by Sokolewicz, 
agreed to the majority of those demands. However, the agreement was not official-
ly signed due to the existence of differences in views on three issues. The gov-
ernment side demanded the retention and the Solidarity side demanded the remov-
al of the constitutional definition of national councils as organs of state authority 
and self-government. The government wanted to introduce full voivodship self-
government, with legal personality and its own property, along with general elec-
tions to voivodship councils (being concurrently state bodies). The Solidarity side 
believed that in the first stage of the reform, commune-level self-government 
ought to be established, while voivodships should be left as territorial units for the 
purpose of government administration, including, however, the representation of 
communes from the voivodship area endowed with social control competencies. 
The government side demanded that the state administration is maintained in 
communes alongside self-government, and the local self-government side de-
manded the liquidation of that administration (Regulski, 2000, p. 50 et seqq.). 
Those discrepancies between the positions of the negotiators and the limited pos-
sibility of reaching a compromise were in a sense understandable. The negotiators 
were not political decision-makers, but they realised that it was a discussion on the 
fundamental and lasting transformation of the system.  
From today’s perspective, it can be seen that the debate taking place then was 
a sign of a revival of a culture of dialogue and cooperation. Only on the basis of 
such a culture, relying on models of understanding among people with diverse 
points of view on public affairs, different world outlooks, social views, and even 
competing political interests, authentic and lasting democracy can be built.  
2. The first stage of the local self-government reform (1990–1997) 
The local self-government reform became possible after the victory of Solidarity 
in the parliamentary elections on June 4, 1989. On the initiative of the Senate, 
after a long-standing discussion and legislative work, on March 8, 1990, the Sejm 
(the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) passed the Act on Local Self-
Government (consolidated text in Journal of Laws, 2001, No. 142 as amended, 
currently entitled: Act on Commune Self-Government, consolidated text, Journal 
of Laws, 2018 item 994). On the same day, the Sejm adopted a constitutional 
amendment introducing the provisions that the Republic of Poland guaranteed the 
participation of local self-government in the exercise of power. The Sejm also 
passed commune council electoral regulations, and after a dozen or so days, the 
Act on Local Self-Government Employees, regulating, among others, issues of 
granting property rights to communes and the creation of civil servant corps 
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of self-government administration. The dualistic model of the territorial system 
was complemented by the Act on Territorial Organs of General Government Ad-
ministration and the so-called Competence Act. Elections to commune councils 
took place on 27 May 1990, and thus the first stage of the local self-government 
reform in Poland began.  
The victory of civic committees in the first local elections was assessed, ra-
ther prematurely, as the actual collapse of the bureaucratic-centralised system, as 
empowered local communities transferred along with the electoral mandate the 
power to local power structures (Buczkowski, 1997, p. 219). Others considered 
the voter turnout as a measure of success, and that was disturbingly low (42.7% of 
those eligible to vote). Despite this fact, success was actually achieved and con-
sisted not so much in filling 50% of seats by candidates of citizens’ committees 
but in the social qualifications of new councillors and obtaining a high degree of 
representativeness of commune councils. The basis for that success was the elec-
toral law which created a wide range of opportunities for local communities, 
groups of citizens and their various organisations to propose candidates for coun-
cillors, without granting any preferences to political parties. Andrzej Piekara 
points out that all that resulted in favourable circumstances for genuine and crea-
tive stimulation of socio-political life, especially the social activity of micro-
communities. Also, conditions for positive selection of candidates for local author-
ities, based on substantive and civic criteria of evaluation, appeared. The begin-
nings of authentic, pluralistic public opinion related to the election campaign 
emerged. Most importantly, the voters became convinced that they could make 
decisions on the composition of the most important authority: the commune coun-
cil. The local authority met the conditions for its democratic legitimisation and 
social acceptance (2005, pp. 147–148).  
The systemic model of local self-government introduced in 1990 correspond-
ed to the classical western (continental) models and to a large extent referred to 
solutions from the interwar period. However, it differed from those models in that 
it was a one-stage model. Only communes, both in urban and rural areas, were 
recognised as local self-government units by virtue of law. They could merge into 
commune unions and also had a voivodship representation (the regional assem-
bly), but there was no self-government at the higher level. The voivodship was 
defined by law as a territorial unit created for the implementation of government 
administration by the voivode and its apparatus. For the same purpose, the voivod-
ship was divided into districts of general administration in which only governmen-
tal bodies operated—the heads of district offices. The voivodes were granted 
strong supervisory powers towards commune self-government, whereas commune 
self-government was given substantively limited competences as well as ineffi-
cient and unstable financial sources of its operations.  
The recognition of the commune as the basic local community of residents, 
competent in public matters of local importance not reserved for other entities, and 
the creation of a legal way for communes to form a supra-commune level for per-
forming public tasks in the form of a voluntary commune union was an important 
step towards the principle of subsidiarity. An important democratic feature of the 
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new territorial system was granting residents of the commune the right to decide 
directly on all important matters of the commune through a local referendum (re-
garding the commune council recall and self-taxation for public purposes on an 
exclusive basis), the free election of councillors according to the rules ensuring the 
representative character of the governing body, the election of the executive body 
(the commune board) by the commune council and its responsibility before the 
council. Decentralisation to the level of the commune expressed itself in the crea-
tion of a guarantee of carrying out independent actions in the scope of its own 
tasks and the right to take legal action against unlawful interference of the super-
visory authority, the introduction of commune property, the determination of 
sources of its own revenue and subsidies from the state budget based on objecti-
fied criteria, as well as the creation of a new professional category of local self-
government employees. A strong advantage of the 1990 reform was the introduc-
tion of self-government to existing communes, without the need to correct the 
territorial division. The network of communes was shaped already in the 1970s 
relatively rationally, as most communes had social and economic ties formed to 
implement public tasks. Communes as territorial units were in principle prepared 
for the adoption of the local self-government system. This is one of the main rea-
sons for the success of the commune reform (cf. different assessments of the re-
form in Piekara (2005, p. 151) and Regulski (2000, p. 367 et seqq.)).  
The provisions of the Constitutional Act of October 17, 1992, the so-called 
Small Constitution, recognising local self-government as the basic form of organis-
ing local public life, the commune as the basic unit of this self-government, and the 
possibility of creating other units through the statue, were undoubtedly the manifes-
tation of decentralisation and self-governmental trends (published in the Journal of 
Laws, No. 84, item 426). Also, the adoption of the Act of 7 October 1992 on the 
Regional Chambers of Accounts (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2016, 
item 561 as amended) as well as the Act of October 12, 1994 on Local Self-
Government Appeal Boards (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2001, No. 79, 
item 856 as amended), and especially the ratification of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government in 1993 (in the Journal of Laws, 1994, No. 124, item 607 
with corrections) pointed to the intention to consolidate the independent position of 
local government units in the public authority system. However, it did not mean that 
decentralisation was recognised as a fundamental, lasting and integral principle of 
that system. Despite the removal of the hegemony of the Communist Party, the 
failure of the local self-government reform still loomed ahead. 
It was an imperfect, unfinished reform. The political solutions of the first half 
of the 1990s did not lead to the dismantling of the centralised and bureaucratic 
system of state governance; they only made a breach in the system, increasing in 
fact its disfunctionality. Its higher levels were left almost entirely under the con-
trol of hierarchically organised government administration bodies. There was no 
reform of the territorial division necessary to allow for the regionalisation of the 
country. Local authorities were not provided with stable and sufficiently efficient 
sources of income and independence in making budget expenditures and manag-
ing communal property. After the SLD–PSL (SLD—Democratic Left Alliance; 
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PSL—Polish People’s Party) coalition took power (1994–1997), decentralisation 
was stopped halfway, threatening to return to the full version of the centralised-
bureaucratic model in governance of society and management of the economy.  
3. The second stage of the local self-government reform 
(since 1998)  
It was necessary to wait for fundamental changes almost until the end of the 20th 
century. In 1997, the new Constitution of the Republic of Poland was enacted and 
adopted by the National Assembly in a referendum. In June and July 1998, on the 
initiative of the centre-right government of Jerzy Buzek, the Parliament enacted 
the systemic laws marking the second stage of the local self-government reform.1 
The 1998–1999 reform assumed the creation of a new territorial system of Poland 
and the building of civil society institutions in accordance with the principles of 
decentralisation of public authority and subsidiarity set out in the new Constitu-
tion. The decentralisation of public tasks was aimed at limiting the central admin-
istration’s activities to managing changes of strategic importance and pursuing the 
policy of protecting the national interest in the administration process. The re-
maining tasks were to be carried out by the territorial administration at the region-
al and local level. At the regional level, both decentralised local self-government 
and territorially decentralised government administration were established. The 
basic task of voivodship self-government was guaranteeing the civilisational de-
velopment of the region, mainly through the determination and implementation of 
its regional policy, and the organisation of public services within the voivodship. 
The government administration under the authority of the voivode as a representa-
tive of the Council of Ministers was assigned the role of protecting the uniformity 
of the state and national interests. For this reason, the voivode was granted the 
competence to coordinate the activities of all governmental (combined and non-
combined) units in the voivodship, adjust the government policy implementation 
to the voivodship conditions, supervise public law entities, including local self-
government, as well as ensure public safety and order in the voivodship.  
At the local level, all public tasks were entrusted in principle to self-
government organised on two levels: the already existing commune level and the 
new poviat one. Their role was defined as the implementation of their own tasks in 
order to meet collective needs of residents of a given commune or poviat as well 
 
                                                          
1 Act on Poviat Self-Government of 5 June 1998 (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2018, item 
995), Act on Voivodship Self-Government of 5 June 1998 (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 
2018, item 913), Act on Government Administration in the Voivodship of 5 June 1998 (in the Journal 
of Laws, No. 91, item 577), replaced by Act on the Voivode and Government Administration in the 
Voivodship of 23 January 2009, (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2017 item 2234), Act on the 
Introduction of the Three-tier Division of the Country of 24 July 1998 (in the Journal of Laws, No. 98, 
item 603, as amended).  
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as government administration tasks stipulated by statutes and entrusted to it on the 
basis of agreements. Poviat self-government was to carry out supra-commune 
tasks, with the exception of conducting business activity.  
The introduction of the three-tier basic territorial division was considered 
a necessary condition for the implementation of the reforms. The most important 
from this point of view was the creation of voivodships, which due to their area, 
population, social situation and economic potential could be considered as self-
governmental regions, corresponding to European standards. A three-fold reduc-
tion in their number (16 instead of 49) was supposed to remove an obstacle to the 
regionalisation of Poland expected by the main bodies of the European Union. 
A by-product of the creation of large voivodships as self-governmental regions 
(more precisely self-governmental and governmental ones) was the restoration of 
poviats. Far too many poviats were created from the point of view of the require-
ments of rational governance, as many as 308 the so-called rural poviats (after two 
years, 7 more, and so 315 in total). However, there were no changes in the number 
of communes or their statutory model, except for the creation of 65 towns with the 
rights of poviats. An important reform of commune self-government was carried 
out in 2002, replacing the previous collegial boards elected and recalled by com-
mune councils with the new single-person executive bodies of communes:  
commune heads, mayors and city presidents, elected directly by residents and 
recalled before the end of the term only through a local referendum.2 Unfortunate-
ly, the last reform served not so much the development of local democracy as the 
transformation of the influence of political parties on the functioning of the com-
mune authority centre. It fundamentally changed the system of power in  
communes, destroying the pervious relative balance of power between legislative 
and executive bodies in favour of the clear dominance of the latter.  
4. The consequences of the reform: the success or crisis of local 
self-government 
According to the intentions declared by the creators of the reform, it was aimed at 
improving the system of public authority in Poland, ensuring higher efficiency 
than before in solving social problems and the functioning of local units in ac-
cordance with the principles of democracy, social pluralism, decentralisation and 
subsidiarity established in Europe. From the perspective of past years, it can be 
stated that the manner of introducing systemic changes and their consequences did 
 
                                                          
2 Act on Direct Elections of the Commune Head, Mayor and City President of 20 June 2002 (in the 
Journal of Laws, No. 113, item 984 as amended) expired. Currently: Act on the Electoral Code of 
Poland of 5 January 2011 (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2018 item 754), Act on Local 
Referendum of 15 September 2000 (consolidated text in the Journal of Laws, 2016, item 400 as 
amended). 
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not fully correspond to the presented assumptions. In addition, after the entry into 
force of the laws introducing the reform, social and political phenomena which 
hindered or prevented the implementation of some of its objectives occurred.  
The 1998–1999 reform did not include the reconstruction of the state govern-
ance centre; hence the structures of ministries and central offices were not adapted 
to the situation in which they no longer implemented separate ministerial policies. 
As a result, the reform consisted to a significant extent in the “decentralisation of 
budgetary difficulties.” In the first years, numerous dysfunctions appeared related 
to the transfer of new tasks to the self-government of voivodships and poviats 
without providing funds for their implementation, for example, in the field 
of health protection, education, social policy, environmental protection, unem-
ployment and employment promotion, modernisation of rural areas, or the man-
agement of public roads. In those areas, there continued to remain governmental 
specialised administration departments whose maintenance still absorbed a signif-
icant part of budgetary funds or separate funds.   
Those defects were corrected in the following years, mainly by creating 
a stronger basis for the regional development policy implemented by voivodship 
self-government. In particular, the financial equilibrium of many local government 
units at this level could already be obtained to a greater extent by means of finan-
cial resources from the European Union Structural Funds. Until recently, there was 
a tendency to expand the scope of activity of voivodship self-government, primari-
ly at the expense of voivodes, concurrently the duties of co-operation in the scope 
of implementation of developmental tasks were imposed on the voivode and local 
self-governments. Nevertheless, the internal integration of self-government within 
the boundaries of individual voivodships remains weak; the underdevelopment of 
ties between local self-governments and voivodship self-government in the scope 
of shaping the content of basic legal documents concerning regional development 
is still noticeable. In fact, communes and poviats have an insignificant influence 
on the content of the voivodship development strategy, the regional operational 
programme and voivodship programmes adopted by the regional assembly. They 
are mainly petitioners of voivodship authorities in the procedures for obtaining aid 
funds. The political mechanism of decision-making processes in voivodship self-
government enables the management of its activities by the central national parties 
that have factions (councillors’ clubs) in the regional assembly and representatives 
on the voivodship executive board, leaving no room for a greater influence on 
these processes to be exerted by local self-governments and non-governmental 
organisations. In the relations between communes and poviats and voivodship 
self-government, it is difficult to find important elements of the implementation of 
the constitutional principle of subsidiarity. 
In the last two decades, at both levels of local self-government, there have 
been more or less successful systemic changes aimed at strengthening the democ-
racy and the efficiency of the functioning of the commune or poviat authority. The 
scope of civic participation has been increased and new institutions have been 
launched (e.g.: opinion-providing referenda, civic legislative initiatives, civic 
budgets in some cities), and the rules for cooperation between self-government 
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authorities and non-governmental organisations have been regulated. Since 2002, 
the aforementioned changed legal model of the executive body has prevailed in 
communes, and in poviats the traditional model has been maintained: the collegial 
board is still elected by the poviat council, but the position of its chairman 
(staroste) has been strengthened along with his or her single-person competences, 
especially in the field of control over poviat services, inspection bodies and guards 
(police, state fire brigade, construction inspectorate, and sanitary inspection). 
A not very effective attempt has been made to realign the accountability of the 
decision-making bodies (commune councils, poviat councils), and in communes 
also the executive bodies, to residents, mitigating the validity conditions of the 
recall referendum (submission of valid votes by at least 3/5 participants of the last 
elections for the recall-threatened body). The legal possibilities of playing a crea-
tive role in the field of local development by local and regional self-governments 
have been extended, but these possibilities are being used to a small degree. All 
this has proven to be insufficient to stop the return of centralistic and bureaucratic 
tendencies in the functioning of local self-government as well as the entire public 
administration. One of the reasons for this process is excessive politicisation (in 
the sense of being party-bound) of the activities of self-government bodies, espe-
cially in larger cities and poviats. For many years, it was considered a conse-
quence of a faulty electoral law favouring voting based on party lists and the dis-
tribution of seats according to the principle of proportionality. Less attention was 
paid to the style of activity of party council clubs. Meanwhile, the credibility of 
the constitutional and statutory construction of the free mandate of self-
government councillors is questionable, since they are chosen by residents but 
mainly among candidates of one or other party, and when making important deci-
sions they are bound by the party (club) discipline. These two factors essentially 
limit the scope of representation by councils of interests other than political ones 
present in the local community as well as the influence of non-party organisations 
and social communities on the way of solving problems related to meeting resi-
dents’ needs. The introduction in 2014 of the principle of majority elections to 
commune councils in single-mandate constituencies (apart from towns with poviat 
rights), contrary to expectations, has not improved the situation, as on the scale of 
the country candidates of national parties have won more votes than others. The 
causes of this phenomenon may vary. The most important, in my opinion, is the 
inconsistency of the reform. It has not encompassed the other of the above-
mentioned factors: the legal status of the councillor has not changed; it is not 
strictly related to the protection of voters’ interests, and especially to keeping 
electoral promises. Residents may still recall the whole council in a referendum, 
but they cannot recall a single councillor who has compromised his or her vow or 
has otherwise lost social credibility. One of the main reasons for the alienation of 
elected local authorities has not been removed, which has had a negative impact 
on their social authority and the ability to effectively solve the problems of collec-
tive life. 
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This alienation has not been removed by the functioning for four terms of the 
model of single-person executive bodies of communes elected directly by resi-
dents. However, it has caused a disruption of the mechanisms of self-government 
representation and threatened the continuity of power in the commune. Commune 
heads, mayors and city presidents have become largely independent of commune 
councils (city councils), leading to a significant reduction in the role of the latter: 
by losing the right of recall of the executive body, councillors have been deprived 
of the basic instrument to enforce the execution of their own resolutions. 
Contrary to the widespread myth, the vast majority of heads of commune ex-
ecutive bodies have not obtained the position of political leaders in the system of 
local authority. This is particularly true of the presidents of large cities. Although 
they have been freed from the imperative pressure of political groups dominating 
in the councils, the leadership of the regional party branches still has formal and 
informal channels of direct influence on their people holding offices in the cities, 
even if they do not act under the party’s name. Moreover, more strongly than 
before, they are dependent on their own bureaucratic apparatus, and they can also 
become hostages of economic interest groups which through their own dominating 
influence on the local government apparatus gain an advantage over competitors 
and other centres of social influence.  
Residents’ lack of faith in the effectiveness of enforcing the democratic re-
sponsibility of self-government authorities, especially commune heads, mayors 
and city presidents, means that there are few recall referendums, and most do not 
bring legal solutions due to a low number of participants. There are quite common 
cases when a commune head, mayor or city president who has not received 
a discharge for the budget or for some other reason has lost the trust of the com-
mune council (city council), e.g.: evidently acting to the detriment of residents, 
still performs the function after “winning” the referendum in which fewer than 3/5 
of the participants of the elections in which the person had obtained a mandate 
took part. Democratic legitimisation of such commune authorities may raise seri-
ous reservations. 
In rural poviats, on the basis of a different legal regulation of the mechanism 
of responsibility of the democratic executive body (recalled by the council, not the 
residents), symptoms of the crisis of this institution are also present. The staroste 
often obtains a dominant position not only in the collegiate executive board but 
also in relation to the poviat council and becomes virtually irremovable until the 
end of the term. This is the consequence of the unsuccessful concept of the poviat 
as the second level of local self-government, fulfilling the tasks related to supra-
commune duties but not conducting business activity. From the very beginning, 
the poviat became an administrative-bureaucratic entity; its authorities are bound 
not so much by the will of residents as by various interest groups influencing 
political groups holding the majority in the council and in the poviat executive 
board. Another serious disadvantage of the system of the poviat is a lack of 
a systemic connection of the activities of its authorities with the interests of com-
munes belonging to a given poviat, and thus the failure to respect their fundamen-
tal role in the system of public authority and the constitutional principle of  
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subsidiarity. Also, the concept of towns with poviat rights, being an attempt to 
distinguish the legal category of large cities without violating the dogma of the 
need to preserve the uniform status of the political system of the commune, has 
proven to be unsuccessful.  
Local (as well as regional) self-government partiocracy is one of the manifes-
tations of appropriation of the Republic by the central apparatus of nationwide 
political parties. Against this background, the consequences of perceiving in the 
mechanisms of the operation of the self-governmental representation primarily 
the arena for political games and the bureaucratisation of the functioning of execu-
tive bodies along with their isolation from the influence of the legislative bodies 
and local society are becoming increasingly visible. There is also a noticeable 
tendency of central offices and leaders of political groups to directly control deci-
sion-making processes in local self-government through issuing instructions and 
orders to party councillors’ clubs as well as party activists holding managerial 
functions and occupying prominent positions in the executive bodies. Especially at 
the level of the voivodship, this leads to the removal of the features of authenticity 
from self-government and to the reduction of the role of regional self-government 
communities to pure fiction. These negative trends are also present in local self-
government. On the other hand, the results of empirical research indicate the 
tendencies of the local elites to closing themselves off, isolating themselves from 
the rest of the residents that are often seen as a group of passive public service 
consumers, able only to choose between providers of these services. Public life 
abnormalities in the form of mafias or local cliques occupying centres of self-
government power for subsequent terms can be observed (cf. Kurczewski, 2007, 
p. 571 et seqq.).  
As a result, two concepts of “therapy” of Polish self-government, which may 
prove more harmful than its diseases, appear more and more clearly. The first is 
based on the belief in the omnipotence of market mechanisms in social life, spread 
with obstinacy, without any basis, along with a new dogma about the necessity of 
full privatisation of public services. The experience of countries where such re-
forms have been carried out, leads to far-reaching caution in their recommenda-
tion. In particular, the trend towards the focus on only economic indicators of the 
effectiveness of local authorities’ operations, the understanding of their mission as 
similar to the role of management boards of commercial companies is dangerous. 
Short-term effects of such an approach may be attractive; the extraordinary suc-
cess in acquiring and using European funds in Poland is attributed to the business 
efficiency of commune heads, mayors and city presidents. In the long-term, such 
reforms, however, result in the loss of access to services by less affluent members 
of the community, the deterioration of their living conditions, and thus the loss of 
trust in the elites, and the breakdown of ties that unite the local self-government 
community (Dębicki, 2001).  
The other concept is expressed in the intention of “nationalising” of self-
government, and at least subjecting local and regional authorities to intense super-
vision by the government administration, including also political pressure. One 
cannot underestimate the temptation to de facto assign self-government authorities 
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a role similar to that played by national and local state administration bodies. The 
tendency to introduce changes in this direction has clearly appeared over the last 
two years. Under various pretexts, the scope of tasks of local self-government 
units and the competences of self-government bodies are being limited and not 
only individual institutions but entire areas of competencies of self-governing 
bodies (e.g.: water management in the voivodship) are transferred to the compe-
tences of voivodes and other bodies of combined administration and existing or 
newly created bodies of non-combined government administration. The repressive 
character of supervisory control of self-government exercised by the government-
appointed voivodes is increasing, which is indicated by, among others, cases of 
expanding their interpretation of the premises for a “substitute” termination of 
mandates of commune heads or mayors due to the alleged violation of the so-
called anti-corruption provisions, when the commune council refuses to apply this 
measure, or issuing discretionary supervisory decisions in matters of the so-called 
de-communising of the names of streets and squares. 
The values of liberty and democracy of local self-government are protected 
by the constitutional principles of decentralisation and the participation of self-
government in the exercise of public authority, at least as long as independent 
judges stand guard over these provisions. However, they do not eliminate the 
described threats completely. These rules may be subject to reinterpretation lean-
ing towards the monism of the local authority. The essence of a monistic system is 
not in conflict at all with formal and legal declarations on decentralisation and 
local democracy. In practice, the relationship between these concepts can be sev-
ered, and they can be deprived of their true social meaning. It is enough that those 
in power in the commune, poviat and voivodship will feel empowered to unilater-
ally determine the content of public interest and behaviour of residents’ dependent 
on their will, not allowing residents to co-decide, and depriving them of the space 
necessary for pursuing individual and group interests that are in need of protec-
tion. The liberal facade of the local government system can still be maintained, but 
the actual political and social pluralism is missing (more in Kasiński, 2009).  
Political orientation and party affiliation of “local leaders” or “managers” un-
derstanding their role in such a way is not really important here, as they become 
a part of the monistic system that hijacks the entire public sphere, the system 
whose distinguishing feature is the hegemony of the bureaucratic apparatus of 
power, separated by a “glass wall” from society, and a sharp caesura between the 
rulers and the ruled. A negative feedback occurs: the weakening of the elements of 
democratic ideas and pluralism on the national scale contributes to similar pro-
cesses in territorial units and vice versa: the tendency of introducing changes in 
the system of central government leading towards bureaucratic (and even police) 
monism is supported by analogical changes in the territorial system. 
Some changes introduced at the beginning of this year in the systemic model 
of local self-government seem to be heading in a different, pro-local and demo-
cratic direction, e.g.: giving the statutory status to citizens’ legislative initiative 
rights and the institution of the civic budget, granting councillors the right of sub-
mitting questions, imposing on councils the duty to define the rules for consulta-
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tions and establishing committees dealing with citizens’ complaints, motions as 
well as petitions and on the executive authorities the duty to submit reports on the 
status of a given unit at the council session each year as well as to subject 
the report to the public debate with the participation of residents, introducing the 
right of refusal of the vote of confidence as grounds for initiating by the commune 
council a referendum on the recall of the commune head and as the premises for 
the recall of the executive body by the poviat council or the voivodship assembly 
(apart from the refusal to grant the vote of approval and “another reason”).3 The 
practical importance of these solutions, however, can only be evaluated after the 
next term of office. It will take a long time to assess the consequences of limiting 
the permissibility of holding the office by a commune head, mayor or president to 
two terms, due to their extension to five years. 
Such innovative measures cannot, however, overshadow the importance of 
the most significant change, which will have consequences in the results of the last 
elections: the retention of the majority rule for commune councils in single-
mandate constituencies only in communes of up to 20,000 inhabitants, in other 
communes the restoration, and in cities with the poviat status, rural poviats and 
voivodships the maintenance, of the principle of proportional elections in multi-
mandate constituencies, which will provide stronger preferences for candidates 
from party lists. It will also serve to unify the principles of shaping the composi-
tion of representative bodies “from top to bottom”, at all levels of the political 
system—from the Sejm to commune councils (except the smallest communes), 
thus restoring or strengthening the partiocracy—probably considered to be benefi-
cial from the point of view of effectiveness of exercising the political control over 
the state and social organism at all levels. Since the legal structure of the council-
lor’s mandate has not changed: it is free from voters’ instructions but depends on 
party instructions imposed, for example, as part of disciplining members of coun-
cillors’ clubs. Legal regulations established in order to increase the influence of 
residents on public authorities may in these circumstances serve to strengthen the 
influence of local or regional party leadership on the activities of local self-
government representations and their executive bodies. The leadership body of the 
ruling party (coalition) does not really conceal the intention to continue the pro-
cess of centralisation of public authority and state interference in local self-
government. Perhaps the leadership is unaware that it is following the well-worn 
path leading to various, seemingly already overcome, varieties of centralism that 
only appear to be democratic. Thus, one should bear in mind Kumaniecki’s warn-
ing: centralism always has a cataclysm at the end of its path (1924, p. 133).  
                                                          
3 Act of 11 January 2018 Amending Certain Laws to Increase Citizens’ Participation in the Process of 
Election, Operation and Control of Some Public Bodies (in the Journal of Laws, 2018, item 130). 
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5. Conclusions 
The experience of the Polish transformation indicates that the introduction of the 
legal principle of political pluralism does not guarantee a deep reconstruction of 
the social system aimed at the authentic empowerment of individuals and social 
groups. After almost thirty years since the beginning of the systemic transfor-
mation, the degree of real self-organisation of society and public involvement in 
public life should be assessed as still remaining highly unsatisfactory. One of the 
signs of this situation is the growing crisis of local self-government, manifested 
not only in a low turnout in local self-government elections (since 1990 it has 
never reached 50% of eligible persons throughout the country), but in general in 
the weakening relationship between its institutions and direct representative local 
democracy, especially in the drastic disappearance of democratic responsibility of 
local self-government authorities. For the first time in recent Polish history, the 
trends of local democracy development collided with a strong technocratic-
bureaucratic counter-trend, this time tinged with vulgar economism or a poorly 
concealed longing for authoritarian solutions.  
The idea of establishing the so-called single-person local leadership, i.e. the 
executive bodies pushing the institutions of the local self-government representa-
tion into the shadow at all levels of these authorities, is particularly controversial. 
I believe that authentic Polish leaders with appropriate experience and talent, and 
the trust and support of the people should manage the communes and other local 
government units. It is necessary to create premises, including legal ones that 
could ensure the selection in the democratic mechanism of people with such char-
acteristics and skills as well as the willingness to act for the benefit of residents in 
cooperation with active citizens—members of the local community. In practice, 
however, these are two different types of political personalities. Some politicians 
consider their activity to be public service, while others undertake such activity to 
gain prestige, power, and related profits. Such politicians are called ruthless politi-
cal players, as their actions are subordinated to self-interest instead of public goals 
(Jakubowska, 2002, p. 83). I express my fear that under current political and legal 
conditions when a party-based or clique-occupied centre of local authority is in-
creasingly isolated from the social forces in the local self-government community, 
it is easier to promote ruthless political players, local or regional caciques and 
mandarins. Unfortunately, some terrible force has been pushing local self-
government in Poland in this direction for a long time.  
To stop these negative processes, it is necessary to awaken the social will to 
restore the fully democratic character of local self-government so that it can be 
credibly called a civilisational value and an authentic institution of civil society. 
Pluralism of the public system cannot bring the expected results if it is not associ-
ated with legal and extra-legal factors that stimulate citizens to participate in pub-
lic life at all levels of the political organisation of society. Ensuring effective, two-
way communication between socially active individuals as well as social groups 
and the centre of local authority is such a factor. In the battle for the necessary 
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reform of public authority, the first demand should be made to base its system on 
the principle of subsidiarity, meaning “strengthening the role of citizens and their 
associations.” Clear recognition is needed in the new or amended Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland of commune residents’ communities as primary entities 
of self-governing units, and their authority should be based on “double legitimisa-
tion”: derived from the statutory act and at the same time rooted in the natural 
rights of the commune resident—to self-govern. The state, in recognising the 
Constitution as the subjective right of an individual to realise together with other 
individuals (neighbours) the common good in the framework of a self-
governmental community, would have the characteristics of a democratic state of 
law respecting the principle of justice in the deepest sense of the word.  
The literature emphasises that modern democracy combines the conviction 
about the natural right of all citizens to participate in making basic political  
choices with the equally natural right of everyone to enjoy freedom in every 
sphere of life, and this freedom can be limited only if it is necessary to protect the 
freedom of individuals and groups (Izdebski, 1993, pp. 51–52). In my opinion, 
this idea should inspire a way of understanding not only individual but also collec-
tive civil rights. Since the system of the modern democratic state combines ma-
jority-rule with respect for individual and minority rights, the law of this state 
cannot ignore the natural right of individuals to the mutual provision of assistance 
and the association for the implementation of the common good. On the contrary, 
statutory law should be aligned with, support and protect these natural laws. This 
is an indispensable condition that determines the building of a healthy society and 
state that serves its interests. Only in this way can one overcome the antagonism 
between society and the state in a manner consistent with the axiology of democ-
racy. The implementation of this requirement in the Constitution and legislation 
can be carried out by following two paths: guaranteeing the freedom of association 
in voluntary social organisations and creating the institutional framework and 
basis for the operation of self-government communities, which by virtue of acts of 
state law participate in the exercise of public authority.  
 I share the view that local self-government is a method of the political or-
ganisation of the state: in the sociological and political sense, it combines the 
features of a natural community of residents with certain features of the legislative 
and executive authority (Dębowska-Romanowska, 1994, pp. 7–8). In the light of 
Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, this 
means “the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to 
regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsi-
bility and in the interests of the local population.” The Republic of Poland, by 
ratifying the Charter, committed itself to respect such an understanding of self-
government: it is the right of the local community to make decisions about its 
affairs and the ability of this community to independently govern and manage 
its affairs. Local communities do not evolve from the will of the state that only 
delineates their boundaries, determines the basic features of the public system and 
defines the framework of their independence. It is true that the state forms 
the basis for the decision-making actions of a community transforming the  
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corporation of citizens into self-government. However, a democratic state must 
recognise citizens’ rights to local self-government; it cannot deprive local authori-
ties of responsibility for the way and results of managing local affairs. Democratic 
local government authorities should respect the legal provisions, but they should 
also be aware that they govern to represent residents’ interests and with residents’ 
involvement.  
The demolition of the left-over from the previous system and now newly 
built wall separating the centre of local authority and residents that are subordinate 
to this authority requires, in my opinion, two types of reformatory actions. First of 
all, it is necessary to make the forms of direct democracy truly real: referenda and 
local elections as well as social consultations. Practices in the light of which these 
forms become a parody of democracy (simulated consultations), a testimony to 
unused democratic opportunities (a low turnout in referenda and elections) or an 
arena of scandalous political and personal games that are in opposition to the 
standards of democratic culture should not be tolerated. Secondly, more effective 
instruments of exerting the influence of citizens and their various associations on 
the functioning of local self-government bodies are needed. Legal regulations 
in the light of which the so-called delegation democracy, i.e. reducing residents’ 
activity to the choice of the council members and possibly the executive body, is 
permitted have proven to be dangerous, as they may result in the formation of 
local and regional “power groups” that are not controlled by society.  
Tools of legal protection against these pathological phenomena can be seen in 
the new provisions of Act of Local Self-Government of January 2018, providing 
for the reconstruction of procedures allowing residents’ access to decision-making 
processes in the council or the assembly, guaranteeing their transparency, and 
extending the catalogue of initiative, consultative and control powers in this area. 
However, the introduction of an effective mechanism of democratic choice and 
democratic accountability of councillors and the executive body would be a deci-
sive step. Commune councillors elected by residents in single-seat constituencies 
and communes should be given the right to choose the commune head, mayor or 
city president if no candidate has obtained at least 50% plus one validly cast votes 
in the general election. It would make the second round of elections—a procedure 
that has little to do with real democracy—unnecessary. The commune council 
should also be granted the right to recall the commune head that has lost its trust if 
less than 50% plus one of eligible population participated and cast valid votes in 
the recall referendum held at the initiative of the council. Only then will it be pos-
sible to speak of the full compatibility of the national commune system with the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government, which in Article 3 Paragraph 2, 
obliges the council (or assembly) to provide the council (or assembly) with suffi-
cient competence to recall the subordinate executive body.  
Is fulfilling the demand for reform in order to protect the most basic values of 
self-government: democracy, independence, and efficiency of local authorities 
realistic? One cannot be under the illusion that the change of the ruling party to 
another one would reverse or hinder dangerous trends of legal transformations of 
the laws on local self-government in the direction of destroying these values. 
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Their survival requires an agreement over political divisions, unfortunately only 
possible on the grounds of the now-defunct culture of dialogue and cooperation.  
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